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The reasons for the current financial crisis are analysed and a proposal for financing a bad 
bank is made. In particular, it is proposed to give the banks in trouble government zero bonds 
rather than cash in exchange for their toxic assets. The term of the zero bonds is determined 
individually according to the effective failure ratio of the toxic assets. As the latter is yet 
unknown, this procedure avoids the problem of evaluating them in advance and at the same 
time ensures that the entire costs of adjustments are lastly borne by the banks themselves 
rather than by the taxpayer. This solution is suitable for all but the worst cases, where 
insolvency is inevitable. It is argued that a similar asset exchange approach has already 
proved to work two times in German History, and that there is no reason to fear that it could 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Few people understand what really happened in the current financial crisis. Even less people 
have an idea how it can be solved. And some of the latter, being involved in the crisis 
themselves, typically have other interests than saving the taxpayers moneybags. This might 
explain why a most obvious way to solve the crisis has not yet made its way in real policy, 
though it has yet been proposed by scientists (van Suntum 2009), journalists (Joffe 2009) and 
politicians (Schäfers/Frühauf 2009).  
 
Here is the story of the bank crisis in short and a simple way how it could be overcome with 
minimum risk for public expenses, by making those who ruined the financial system making 




2.  A short story of the current financial crisis  
 
The current financial crisis with its tentative culmination in 2008/09 can best be explained by 
starting with the fundamentals of typical bank balance:  
 
Table i: A bank`s balance  
 
Assets  Liabilities and Equity 
Cash Reserves R  Deposits and Borrowings D 




On the liability side, we see the bank`s equity E and also the debt D which, in the simplest 
case, are deposits held by the public. On the assets side, there are both the bank`s loans L and 
cash reserves R. Thus formally we have for the balance sheet total T: 
 
E D R L T + = + = ) 1 (   
 
In principle, there are three important ratios to prevent the bank from failing:   3
 
•  Reserves must be sufficiently large in relation to debt to ensure the bank`s liquidity at any 
time. Reserves can be either fractional according to the ratio given by the monetary 
authorities or voluntarily held. Anyway, they should not undergo a minimum ratio of debt. 
Formally, with  , / D R ≡ α we have 
 
D R min ) 2 ( α ≥   
 
•  Even if the liquidity constraint (2) is met, the bank could fail if total debt should exceed 
total assets, i.e. if its equity becomes negative. Thus, with C E/ ≡ β  as the equity/credit-
ratio, we have the additional “Basel II” requirement 
 
  L E min ) 3 ( β ≥  
 
•  Even if both the liquidity constraint (2) and the minimum equity/debt ratio (3) are met, the 
bank could fail, namely when its long term costs exceed its long term receipts. With the 
average loan interest (net of allowances) iL and the average debt interest iD (net of costs) 
we therefore have  
 
0 * * ) 4 ( ≥ − D L i D i L  
 
Because of the leverage effect, the bank has the incentive to minimize both the liquidity ratio 
R/D and the equity ratio E/L within the limits of (2) and (3) respectively. The simple reason is 
that, with the interest on debt iD being below the interest on loans iD, the rate of return on 
equity rE (and thereby the enterprise value of the bank) is c.p. maximized by minimizing both 
α  and β :  
R D L
i D i L
E
i D i L
r
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From (5) it immediately follows that rE is the higher, the less reserves are held and – with ic > 
id - the higher is D/E. On the other hand, small values of α  and β  increase of course the risk 
to fail.  
   4
Employing these simple relationships, one can readily explain what went wrong. Suppose 
that, starting from a sound financial situation, the monetary authorities increase money supply 
more than would be appropriate with respect to economic growth (as both the FED and the 
ECB actually did after 2001). Assume that a substantial part of excess money supply flows 
into the asset markets, thereby boosting both house prices and stock prices.  In the simplest 
case, both the bank sector`s total balance sheet and all of its components could rise at the asset 
inflation rate, thereby leaving bothα andβ unaltered. Even then there would accrue a 
considerable systemic risk, which is not visible in any bank statistic.  
 
The reason is that, due to declining interest rates and idle money reserves, additional real 
investments are carried out which are inferior to those formerly done in terms of either 
profitability and/or safety.  This phenomenon is nothing else than the core of the old monetary 
overinvestment theories by Hawtrey, Wicksell, and Hayek (Haberler 1963). While at the 
beginning of the 21th century overinvestment concentrated in the new economy, thereafter it 
boosted the real estate bubble in the United States and elsewhere. Houses were bought 
without a cent of own capital by people who normally would not have afforded to do so. 
Stock prices were driven by the easy money policy to heights which were far from being 
fundamentally justified. 
 
As long as asset price inflation continues, everything seems to be fine with the bank`s balance 
sheets. The equity/loan ratio looks even particularly sound: When L increases due to rising 
stock prices, E increases by the same absolute value and, hence, the equity/loan relation 
improves because of L > E. This effect mislead the bank managers to further exhaust the 
leverage effect by giving new credits and financing it by new debt (rather than by fresh 
equity). This is exactly what happened after 2001, strongly facilitated by new “creative” 
financial instruments which helped to circumvent the legally required min β .  
 
It must be stressed, however, that this is only an additional factor of the growing instability. 
The true core of the problem is the collective overestimation of asset values due to 
inflationary monetary policy. The problem is quite similar to the main failure of the 18th 
century real bills doctrine, which was proposed among others by James Steuart and – tellingly 
– by John Law, the guy who later plunged the French financial system into ruin. According to 
that doctrine, any excess issue of money would be automatically prevented by a free banking 
system, if only some simple rules were kept in. In particular, only real bills rather than   5
fictitious bills should be discounted. The proponents of the doctrine erroneously thought that 
with this rule exclusively the “real” needs of trade would be financed. Their key failure was 
that the needs of trade are lastly defined in nominal terms rather than in terms of real goods, 
and thus the real bills doctrine did not at all prevent inflation (Mints 1956, Laidler 1984, 
Velde 2007).  
 
The evaluation of bank assets in nominal terms without allowing for pure inflationary effects 
in the equity/loan-ratio is equally misleading. With equity E being often less than 10 percent 
of the bank`s loans L, even a moderate decline of assets due to stock price losses or because 
of exceptional write-offs can easily drive the bank into insolvency. Because a crash of asset 
prices is inevitably programmed by a former bubble, there results a systemic failure which 
cannot be outweighed by proper diversification and distribution of risks within the bank 
system. Hence, looking at the current crisis that way, the question should not be “Why did it 
happen?” but rather “How could it work well for such a long time?”. Note that there have 
been many heads ups, both in history and in more recent times (Kindleberger et. al. 2005). 
But apart from a handful of lone voices (among them Wolfram Engels 1996), they were not 
taken seriously.   
 
What are the next steps into the crisis to follow? Sooner or later the monetary authorities 
become worried about rising prices and start to increase their interest rates. In the current 
crisis, this happened since the middle of the century. Now the poor performance of the 
artificially induced extra investments (in particular in the housing sector) becomes evident. As 
a consequence, the value of bank assets declines both due to unbudgeted allowances and 
falling stock prices. Moreover, short term interest approached long term interest and finally 
even exceeded it since the midst of 2007. Now the banks saw the fatal face of the leverage 
effect: Not only did the losses in asset value rapidly decrease their equity, but in addition they 
suddenly had to pay more for borrowing than they get back from lending.  
 
Not surprisingly, such an awkward combination results in insolvency for some of the banks. 
The others must try to regain creditability by raising their equity/loan ratioβ . Unless they can 
manage to get fresh capital, the only way to do this is shortening their loans. Paradoxically, 
the liquidity ratio α is thereby even pushed up just in the middle of the crisis. This is nothing 
else than the reflection of a dramatically increased liquidity preference, not only of the people, 
but in particular of the banks themselves. At the same time, however, credit supply for   6
investments decreases or becomes at least more expensive. The banks even prefer to treasure 
up their money with the central bank rather than running new risks and further deteriorating 
their equity/loan ratioβ . This happens because of the beginning slowdown in the real 
economy, which is at the same time thereby enforced: Crisis feeds the crisis.  
 
At first sight, this seems to be a true Keynesian scenario. However, other than in a Keynesian 
liquidity trap, at this stage we have the phenomenon of extreme liquidity preference with high 
rather than low interest rates for the firms, although central bank interest rates are low or even 
zero. As an illustration, bank reserves with the European Central Bank rose by the factor 1000 
between September and October 2008. At the same time both short term interest and long 
term interest remained high with approximately 5 and 4.5 percent respectively. As a result, in 
spite of excess liquidity it becomes more and more difficult for firms to obtain credits at all, 




3.  What can be done: An asset exchange plan 
 
To summarize our short analysis above, the following three factors have considerably 
contributed to the current financial crisis and its infection of the real economy. These factors 
are  
 
•  initially a massive excess issue of central bank money, followed by  
•  both an asset price inflation and a hazardous overworking of the leverage effect by the 
bank system, and  
•  finally, after the bubble had burst, a collective flight into liquidity.  
 
The early policy reactions targeted both the liquidity/debt ratio and the equity/loans ratio of 
the bank system. By decreasing interest rates for central bank money and giving public 
guarantees for both bank deposits and liabilities a bank run could successfully be prevented. 
Moreover, many banks were given fresh equity by the government in order to prevent 
insolvency due to over-indebtedness. However they did not really solve the core problem, 
namely the toxic assets in the banks balances.  
                                                 
1 As even Wolfram Stützel (1974) had put it: Liquidity follows solvency, not the other way round, see also 
Sachverständigenrat (2007, 125).   7
 
Note that, in order to restore the initial equity/loan ratio, one Dollar of fresh equity must be 
injected for every Dollar lost at the asset side. Although the government is entitled to future 
profits of the particular bank in exchange, this way could turn out to be extremely costly for 
the taxpayer, in particular if the true value of existing capital is already negative. The 
guarantee measure appears to be less costly at first sight, because in the end only that part of 
the toxic paper`s value must be stand up for which has actually been written off. However, as 
there is no profit sharing as a compensation for the taxpayers in this case, they could finally 
be left even worse off. 
 
The limited success of the early rescue measures eventually brought the bad bank plan on the 
agenda. Neglecting the details, the plain idea is that the government should simply buy the 
toxic papers from the banks and thereby tackle the problem from the asset side of their 
balances. From the viewpoint of the banks, this appears to be a most advantageous approach. 
It is not only that they get rid of their sins of the past, but in addition they snatch cash from 
the government without any equivalent compensation. It is little surprise that this solution is 
favoured both by many people in the financial sector and some of those politicians who are 
near to them.         
 
Is, accordingly, the bad bank just another bad idea? As it is often the case, the answer depends 
on how it is done. Simply giving the banks cash at a one to one rate in exchange for their 
scrap papers would doubtlessly be a disastrous waste of money. But there is a better way. 
Why not give them government zero bonds, which must be held for several years and are to 
be exchanged for cash or ordinary government bonds thereafter (van Suntum 2008)? A similar 
way has already been gone twice in German history, namely after World War II and after 
German unification (Baumgart 1957, Schnelloh 1955, Kreiss 2003). In both cases the so 
called “Ausgleichsforderungen” replaced the worthless bonds issued by the German Reich 
and the German Democratic Republic respectively. The government paid interest on the 
bonds and eventually bought them back from the banks later on. By this elegant way the 
latter`s initial balance problem has been distributed on many years, rather than disturbing the 
banks by the way of a unique, huge write off. 
 
In the current crisis, we should do roughly the same. However, because this time the crisis 
was caused by the banks themselves, there is no reason why the bonds should bear an interest.   8
A much more reasonable and at the same time cheaper way is buying the toxic assets in 
exchange for government zero bonds with a long, though finite term.   
 
The advantages of this proposal are quite obvious (van Suntum 2009):  
 
•  Once the toxic assets are removed from the balance, the uncertainty and distrust in the 
bank sector will vanish. 
•  The zero bonds cause a kind of negative leverage effect for the respective bank: Because 
they do not bear interest, the rate of return on equity is reduced the more, the more toxic 
papers have been replaced by them.  
•  Therefore, instead of being sent into the hell of bankruptcy, the banks have to go through 
purgatory.  
•  The government can try to sell the toxic papers within the next years, without having to 
pay for them in advance, nor must interest be paid on the government bonds till the day of 
their maturity.   
•  Burdened by the zero bonds on the asset side of their balance, the banks have a strong 
incentive to revive their ordinary business of giving loans to firms and credits to the 
public. 
 
Nevertheless, there remain some open questions. Firstly, it seems unclear at which rate the 
toxic assets should be exchanged for the zero bonds. Secondly, a decision must be made on 
the maturity term of the bonds. Thirdly, the effectiveness of financial markets might be 
hampered by the burden of the bonds. Last not least, the costs for the taxpayer appear to be 
untransparent and difficult to calculate. However, these issues can be solved most easily and 
even simultaneously, because they are all related to each other and, in a way, are just different 
sides of the same coin.  
 
First of all, it is of crucial importance to understand that a zero bond has a real value V which 
is substantially below its nominal value, depending on both its maturity term n and the 
adequate target rate i. For example, with n = 20 and i = 5%, according to the present value 









V    9
 
 
This is substantially below the nominal value of the bond. Moreover, at least part of the real 
costs can be regained by the government by selling those toxic papers which need not be 
totally written off.  
 
Of course, it must be made sure that the government zero bonds in the bank`s balance are 
nevertheless validated at their nominal value, which is 100 in our example. This can be 
justified by the fact that they are entirely safe and will actually be exchanged at their nominal 
value of 100 at date n. Moreover, cash reserves also appear in the balance with their nominal 
value, although they are dead stock. In case of need, balance rules concerning government 
zero bonds should be changed accordingly, for otherwise the asset exchange would not help at 
all. In times where we discuss the socialisation of banks, where the world financial system is 
at stake, and where we talk about billions of taxpayer`s Dollars, such a change in balance 
rules surely is the least problem.   
 
From these considerations follows an obvious procedure how to assess the true value of the 
toxic assets taken over by the government. The idea is to make their price in terms of present 
value just equal to the present value of the receipts which the government can realize by 
selling them at the market. This can simply be done by determining the term of the zero bonds 
only after the true value of the toxic papers has become clear. This procedure obviously 
solves the problem that the true asset value is yet unknown, and ensures at the same time that 
the taxpayer is finally not charged at all.  
 













where ZB/VZB is the relation of the validation of the toxic assets in the bank`s balance and 
their true market value, and i is the adequate target rate. If, for example, i = 5% and, after 
some years, the true value of the toxic assets turns out to be only 30% of the price at which 
they have been exchanged to zero bonds, according to (7) the latter`s term should be 
determined at 10.47 years. If the final term determination can only be made after more than n
*   10
years, the bank can be given respective compensation, otherwise after n
* years the zero bonds 
are bought back by the government at the same price at which they had been taken over. In 
either case, the costs for the taxpayer are definitely zero. Voila, that’s it.    
 
Some argue that this plan would reduce future competitiveness of the respective banks and 
thereby possibly hamper the financial markets of a country which adopts it. However, this is 
not true. In contrast, the price is paid exclusively by those who own the bank`s equity at the 
time when the plan is launched. For as soon as it becomes clear that future receipts of the 
bank will be squeezed by the burden of government bonds which do not bear any interest, the 
stock price of the bank`s equity will drop to a level such that the economy´s average level of 
return on investment is met again. Admittedly, with an uncertain term n
* of the zero bonds, 
there remains some uncertainty on the bank`s future performance. However, in contrast to 
having toxic assets with an unpredictable debt fault rate, this uncertainty is only on the 
duration of depressed profits, but there is no longer the risk of bankruptcy because of a 
sudden, huge write off. This exactly makes the difference with the asset exchange plan: 
reliable purgatory instead of uncertain risk of hell. 
          
 
4.  The asset exchange plan in more detail: An example 
  
For a more detailed example of the whole story told above, we start again with a simplified 
model of a bank`s balance sheet. However, in contrast to the even more simplified model 
from above, we now divide loans in good loans GL and toxic loans TL. We also divide 
liabilities in ordinary deposits OD and bonds of debt BD. We assume that good loans GL are 
entirely safe, but bear a relatively low interest rate iGL. In contrast, expected interest on toxic 
loans iTL is higher, but on the other hand they bear a risk of loan fault. Concerning liabilities, 
we assume that interest on bonds of debt iBD exceeds interest on ordinary deposits, both being 
below of iGl and, therefore, also below of iTL.  
 
For simplicity, we assume an infinite time horizon, so that the present value of any asset 
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where f is the failure rate for the particular asset, iA is its nominal rate of return, and i is again 
the adequate target rate.  
 
In the sequel we use the following simple numerical example: 
 
 
Table ii: The bank´s balance before the crisis 
 
Interest rates  Assets  Liabilities  Interest rates 
1%  Reserves R  20  Ordinary Deposits OD  20  2% 
5%  Good Loans GL  40  Bonds of Debt BD  70  4% 
10%  Toxic Loans TL  40  Equity E  10  10% 
  Total T  100  Total T  100   
 
Table ii depicts the bank`s balance before the outbreak of the crisis. The interest rate on good 
loans iGL = 5% is also used as the target rate i. Concerning the toxic loans, we assume a 
failure rate of 50%, such that with the interest rate iTL= 10% their market value just equals 
their nominal value as it is accounted for in the balance. Long term cash flow can then be 
calculated as 
 
0 . 1 * * * ) 1 ( * * * ) 9 ( = − − − + + = BD OD TL GL R i BD i OD i f TL i GL i R C   
 
From equation (5) it follows that C/E = 10%. We assume that the target interest rate on equity 
r
* is higher than the respective target rate on loans, due to the higher risk of equity. In our 
example, we assume that the average ROI in the economy, that must be met by every bank, is 
r
* = 8%. Then it follows that the market value of equity is  
 
50 . 12 ) 10 ( * = =
r
C
VE   
 
Hence the shareholders of the bank are richer than is indicated in the balance, where equity 
has only a nominal value of E = 10. 
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Now suppose that the crisis starts and the additional risks are detected. Let the rate of debt 
fault of the toxic loans rise to f = 70%.  Then, according to equations (8) to (10), we have VTL 
= 24 for the market value of the toxic assets, C = 0.20 for the long term cash flow and VE = 
2,5 for the market value of the bank`s equity, which is now even below of its original balance 
value, though still positive. The problem is, however, that in case of a proper write off of the 




Table iii: The bank`s true balance in the crisis 
 
  
Interest rates  Assets  Liabilities  Interest rates 
1%  Reserves R  20  Ordinary Deposits OD  20  2% 
5%  Good Loans GL  40  Bonds of Debt BD  70  4% 
10%  Value of Toxic 
Loans VTL 
24 Equity  E  -6  -3.33% 
  Total T  84  Total T  84   
 
 
Note that E is negative, although VE is still positive, i.e. of the three possible causes of 
insolvency referred to in Section 2 only the second one (over-indebtedness), but not the third 
one (negative long term cash flow) is relevant in this example. This is a necessary condition 
for the asset exchange plan to work. Otherwise, i.e. with both a negative equity E and a 
negative long term cash flow C, the bank must either be closed or given fresh capital by the 
government (if it is of systemic relevance). 
 
Table iv: The bank`s balance with the asset exchange approach 
 
Interest rates  Assets  Liabilities  Interest rates 
1%  Reserves R  20  Ordinary Deposits OD  20  2% 
5%  Good Loans GL  40  Bonds of Debt BD  70  4% 
0%  Zero Bonds ZB  40  Equity E  10  2% 
  Total T  100  Total T  100     13
 
With the asset exchange plan being adopted, the bank`s balance looks like it is depicted in 
Table iv. The former toxic loans TL are now replaced by government zero bonds ZB, which 
have an equal nominal value of 40, but yield zero interest. The contribution of the latter to 
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In our example, this yields iRB = 5%*24/40 = 3%. From equation (9) total long term cash flow 
can then be calculated as C = 0.2, which is exactly the same value as without the rescue plan 
(see above). Accordingly, also the bank`s stock value is still VE = C/r
* = 2.5. In other words, 
the asset exchange does neither alter the bank`s long term profits nor the market value of its 
equity. Yet the balance problems from Table iii have completely vanished in Table iv.  
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The proposed asset exchange approach does of course not instantly lead to an economic 
recovery. Meanwhile the financial crisis has infected the real economy, as it did in the 
1930ies. Finding out of the resulting recession is quite another story. On the other hand, 
without solving the bank`s balance problem there is little hope that the crisis can be overcome 
at all. The proposal of this paper therefore tackles a core issue. Apart from the theoretical 
argument, it can rely on positive experiences with a similar approach in German Economic 
History. As has been shown above, unlike the then employed Ausgleichsforderungen, the zero 
bond approach avoids to charge the taxpayer and puts the burden on those, who are 
responsible for the current crisis. After having gained from hazardously overstressing of the 
leverage effect, with the asset exchange approach they will be burdened by a kind of negative 
leverage effect, that reduces their profits just as long as is necessary for amortizing the write 
offs on their toxic loans. At the same time, the approach provides a solution for the 
assessment of the value of these loans.  
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Given these features, the bank`s shareholders will presumably be less enthusiastic about the 
plan than the taxpayers. Thus it may be helpful for its implementation that the latter are in the 
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